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REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 





Immigration is a topic on the minds and tongues of many of our country’s 
citizens and noncitizens alike. Anecdotally, it appears that almost every person in 
the country has an opinion about “immigration” and opinions about our United 
States immigration laws, but few have ever read the laws.
1
 Fewer still have ever 
seen or participated in an immigration court proceeding.
2
 Our immigration courts 
are very busy forums in which immigration judges make decisions concerning 
which noncitizens may be allowed to remain in the United States and which should 
be deported.
3
 Among their duties, immigration judges preside over asylum cases.
4
 
The asylum provisions of our immigration law attempt to ensure humanitarian 
relief for victims of persecution.
5
 These provisions dictate that a noncitizen may be 
granted asylum if he or she can prove a well-founded fear of persecution if returned 
to his or her home country.
6
 Asylum is a form of relief from deportation known as 
“discretionary relief.”
7




One such case that I wrote about in a previous article, typical of many, 
“involved Gramoz Prestreshi,
9
 an eighteen-year-[old] citizen of Kosovo who was 
stalked and beaten almost to death by a group of local [thugs] because he was a 
 ________________________  
 *  Leonard Birdsong is a Professor of Law at Barry University School of Law in Orlando, Florida. He 
received his B.A. (Cum Laude) at Howard University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. He teaches 
immigration law, refugee and asylum law, and criminal law. He wishes to thank Professor Frederick Jonassen for 
reading and commenting on drafts of this article, and he thanks his Research Assistant, Carissa Aponte, for her 
editorial assistance. He also wishes to acknowledge Reference Librarians Louis Rosen and Patricia Brown of the 
Barry University School of Law Library for their excellent and valuable research assistance in preparation of this 
article. Finally, he wishes special thanks to Dean Leticia Diaz for her financial support by awarding a research 
grant from Barry University School of Law for the completion of this project 
 1. Our country’s immigration laws are found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 as 
amended. The INA has been codified in the United States Code Annotated at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (1952).  
 2. This is a personal observation. 
 3. EOIR at a Glance, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/EOIRataGlance09092010.htm [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1952); see also id.  
 6. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2005). 
 7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (B) (2005).  
 8. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3. 
 9. See Leonard Birdsong, A Legislative Rejoinder to “Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your 
Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution,” 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197, 
198 (2008). 
1
: Reforming Immigration Courts
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013




 Prestreshi was laughed at and was called names by the police to 
whom he reported the beating.
11
 In the hospital emergency room he was made to 
“mop up his own blood.”
12
 “He had photographs taken of his injuries” and 
complained to the press about the hostile environment homosexuals endure in 
Kosovo.
13
 His family later disowned him for his sexual orientation.
14
 “He joined a 
gay rights organization” and in 2007 was granted asylum in the United States on 
the grounds that his treatment in Kosovo amounted to persecution.
15
 
The outcome in Prestreshi’s case was one of the favorable ones to come out of 
immigration court. Conversely, many noncitizens with meritorious claims are 
denied grants of asylum by the immigration courts.
16
 Recent research shows that 
the outcome of one’s asylum claim may depend upon arbitrary factors such as 
which immigration judge is randomly assigned to the case, whether the judge is a 
man or a woman, and whether an attorney represents the noncitizen.
17
 This begs the 
question: Is asylum adjudication fair and impartial within our immigration courts? I 
have personally concluded that often such adjudication is not fair and is not 
impartial. Justice may be being denied in many asylum cases due to the broad 
discretion given to immigration judges to issue discretionary relief in asylum cases. 
Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag of Georgetown Law 
School in their Asylum Study have described the differing outcomes in asylum 
decisions as “refugee roulette.”
18
 The study is a monumental piece of work that has 
been cited by scholars and others interested in refugee law.
19
 It analyzes databases 
of immigration decisions of over 133,000 cases over a six-year period.
20
 Using 
cross-tabulations based on biographies, the Asylum Study also “explores 
correlations between sociological characteristics of individual immigration judges 
and their [asylum] grant rates.”
21
  
When examining the workings of our immigration courts, one will find that 
they are really not courts as most people think of judicial tribunals set up under the 
 ________________________  
 10. Pamela Constable, Persecuted Gays Seek Refuge in U.S., WASH. POST, July 10, 2007, at A6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, & Philip Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 401 (2007) [hereinafter Asylum Study] (explaining that factors such as 
caseload may contribute to the denial of many asylum cases).  
 17. Id. at 296. 
 18. Id. at 295. 
 19. See, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010); 
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New 
Legal Theory, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009); Kevin Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599 (2009); Stephen Legomsky, Learning to Live with 
Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN L. REV. 413 (2007); Margaret Taylor, Refugee 
Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 475 (2007); Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. 
REV. 467 (2008); and Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 
(2009). 
 20. Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 296. 
 21. Id. 
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auspices of Articles I, III, or IV of the United States Constitution or those set up 
under the auspices of various state constitutions. Instead, the immigration courts of 
the United States are a branch of the United States Department of Justice known as 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
22
 They are administrative 
tribunals devoted to hearing immigration matters, mainly deportations. 
The Attorney General of the United States is the head of the EOIR and 
appoints immigration judges to the courts.
23
 This method of judicial appointment 
has always appeared to me to create a conflict of interest. If the Attorney General 
appoints the immigration judges, can these judges be fair and impartial to asylum 
seekers when they owe their job to the Attorney General? In many cases, I believe 
the answer is no; they cannot divorce the political pressure they face from the 
Attorney General from the outcome of their asylum cases. 
For those of us who have practiced in the immigration court system over the 
years, we understand there are many problems with asylum adjudication. To begin, 
most of the immigration judges have come from the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)
24
 and have a law enforcement background and 
mindset.
25
 Until recently, there had been little training for immigration judges.
26
 
More often than not, immigration judges deny asylum claims.
27
 Such denials most 




The immigration judges are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the 
Attorney General of the United States, the country’s chief law enforcement officer. 
 ________________________  
 22. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, About the Office¸ http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Oct. 
19,.2013).  
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) was created on January 9, 1983, through an internal 
Department of Justice (DOJ) reorganization that combined the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA [or Board]) 
with the Immigration Judge function previously performed by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) (now part of the Department of Homeland Security). Id.  
 23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4):  
The term “immigration judge” means an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as an 
administrative judge within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, qualified to 
conduct specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing under section 1229a of this 
title. An immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such 
duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe, but shall not be employed by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. 
Id.  
 24. See DAVID A. MARTIN, T. ALEXANDER ALIENIKOFF, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, & MARYELLEN 
FULLERTON, FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY at xi (Thomson West 2007). INS—”until 2003, [as] a 
component of the Department of Justice, INS was the lead federal agency on immigration policy and operations. In 
2003, INS was abolished [by Congress] and its functions were transferred to three separate units of the new 
Department of Homeland Security.” Id. Those three separate units are the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, the 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
 25. This is a personal observation gained through career experience as a U.S. State Department Foreign 
Service officer who sometimes worked closely with immigration enforcement officers. A few of them later moved 
on to serve as immigration judges. 
 26. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND ENSURING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEM, 
121 (May 18, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/EOIRtestimony05182011.pdf. 
 27. See Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 340 (suggesting that asylum denial rates outweigh grant rates by at 
least 8.8% and that the absence of counsel contributes to a high denial rate). 
 28. Id. 
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There is no set term limit on the appointment of the immigration judges. In order to 
avoid disappointing their boss, the Attorney General, judges may intentionally 
avoid providing “too many” grants of asylum. Furthermore, because asylum grants 
are discretionary relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a form of 
relief that grants immigration judges unlimited discretion in deciding asylum cases, 
only the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
29
 and the relevant federal circuit 
have jurisdiction to review. 
30
 
Finally, there are problems and inconsistencies in asylum adjudications 
because certain statutory terms are ambiguously defined, including “persecution,”
31
 
and there is a lack of precedent with respect to asylum decisions. “Very few 
[immigration] court decisions are published each year.”
32
 “As a result of the lack of 
published opinions, it is difficult to determine or analyze whether important 
precedents have been established in the system.”
33
 Also, immigration judges do not 
have the power to hold attorneys or applicants that appear before them in contempt 
of court.
34
 Any independent court system should grant contempt power to its judges 
as a weapon and/or tool to help control their court proceedings. As a result of some 
of these problems, noncitizen applicants and new legal practitioners often do not 
understand the immigration court system and, more often than not, may believe 
that the court is rigged to avoid grants of asylum.
35
 
Recent research, which will be discussed later in this article, indicates that the 
number of asylum filings in immigration court is down but that the rate of grants of 
asylum has risen.
36
 This is a favorable development that validates my belief that 
our immigration court system is becoming more just in its asylum adjudications. 
My personal observations through recent visits to immigration courts in San 
Francisco and Orlando
37
 affirm my belief that the courts are staffed by very 
hardworking, earnest judges and staffers that seek to do justice with respect to 
asylum seekers. However, there is still room for improvement as the immigration 
 ________________________  
 29. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is a component of the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR). DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3. 
 30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (1996). 
 31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (lacking a definition of the word “persecution”). 
 32. Stuart Grider, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States—In Re Tenorio, No. A72 
093 558 (EOIR Immigration Court, July 26, 1993), 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 213, 215 (1994). 
 33. Leonard Birdsong, “Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, 
Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .”: The New Grounds for Grants of Asylum, 32 NOVA L. REV. 
357 (2008).  
 34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006) (implying a lack of authority of immigration judges to sanction 
contemptuous actions from its failure to mention such authority). 
 35. No court system is without some problems. Many of the problems so far outlined in this article may 
make the faint of heart want to run from practice in immigration court. But take heart, a practice dedicated to 
representing clients in immigration court can be some of the most important work a lawyer can perform because 
such work is part of a worldwide effort to assure humanitarian relief for victims of persecution. Asylum lawyers 
believe much of their work is helping to save the lives of those who may be sent back to a country where they 
might face harsh persecution and, in some cases, even death. There is much persecution in the world. Many of 
those fleeing persecution come to the United States. 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. The author spent May 30, July 16, and July 18, 2012, observing master calendar hearings and an 
asylum hearing in the Orlando Immigration Court. The author also visited the San Francisco Immigration Court 
and observed master calendar hearings on June 20, 2012. 
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/2
Fall 2013 Reforming Immigration Courts 21 
 
courts could use more judges, law clerks, and interpreters that would help more 
asylum seekers like Mr. Prestreshi avoid persecution in their home countries.  
I believe that our immigration courts should become Article I Courts like the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court and the U.S. Tax Court. This would make the immigration 
courts independent of the Department of Justice and immune from possible 
political pressure from the Attorney General. Immigration Judge Dana Leigh 
Marks, past president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, has 
advocated for making immigration courts an Article I Court: 
Experience teaches that the review function [of the court] works 
best when it is well-insulated from the initial adjudicatory function 
and when it is conducted by decision makers entrusted with the 
highest degree of independence. Not only is independence in 
decision making the hallmark of meaningful and effective review, 




Immigration courts, as they are now situated as part of the EOIR do not 
provide the kind of judicial independence that is critical to the perception and 
reality of the fair and impartial review Judge Marks describes. 
One of my purposes in writing this article is to strongly reaffirm my support 
for our use of asylum as a way of providing justice for those fleeing persecution 
from other countries.
39
 My second purpose for writing this article is to help educate 
those interested in asylum law by providing some history and background on 
asylum. Part II of the article will briefly discuss the history of asylum; enumerate 
the eligibility requirements for asylum; describe court proceedings in asylum cases; 
recount recent statistics on grants of asylum; and also include a brief history of our 
immigration courts. Part III will examine the six significant problem areas our 
immigration courts have wrestled with during the last decade with respect to 
asylum caseloads. Part IV will examine a few of the proposals put forth over the 
last thirty years to transform the immigration court system into an Article I 
Legislative Court. 
Perhaps, Congress will revisit the idea of separating the immigration judiciary 
from the Department of Justice. However, there seems to be little political will in 
Congress to accomplish this. Hopefully, this article will provide “food for thought” 
in that regard. 
 ________________________  
 38. Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration 
Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 21 (2008) (quoting Comm’n on Immigr. Reform, Becoming an American: 
Immigration and Immigrant Policy 174 (1997)). 
 39. The author has represented a goodly number of asylum seekers in immigration court over the years and 
has written two articles examining the phenomenon of persecution based on sexual orientation and gender violence 
as grounds for grants of asylum. In a previous article the author wrote that: “An integral part of our immigration 
law is the implementation of rules of human rights allowing those persecuted in their homeland to seek protection 
in the United States.” Birdsong, supra note 33, at 360. I also cited therein John A. Russ IV who maintains, 
“asylum and human rights doctrines are intertwined in that how a country defines persecution reflects its beliefs 
about what constitutes human rights violations.” Id. at 360 (citation omitted).  
5
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II.  BACKGROUND ON ASYLUM 
A.   History 
A brief history and background on asylum is required to appreciate how 
asylum came to be part of our immigration law. International norms for refugee 
protection are outlined in the 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
40
 Under the Convention, the term 
“refugee” applies to: 
Any person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular group, or political opinion, is outside his country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country: or who, not having 
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 




The 1951 Convention provided protection for World War II refugees.
42
 Future 
refugees were included in the 1967 Protocol.
43
 The United States acceded to the 
Protocol in 1967, but Congress did not enact its own Refugee Act until 1980.
44
 Our 
government codified the Protocol such that an applicant for asylum must have:
45
 
(1) a “well-founded fear of prosecution;”
46
 (2) the fear must be based on past 
persecution or the risk of future persecution;
47
 (3) the persecution must be “on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion;”
48
 and (4) the persecutor must be the government or someone 
whom the government is unwilling or unable to control.
49
 
 ________________________  
 40. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter 1951 Convention], reprinted in GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 573, 588 (3d ed. 2007). 
 41. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (referring to the 
definition of “refugee” in the 1951 Convention), reprinted in GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE 
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 573, 588 (3d ed. 2007).  
 42. Deborah A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and Sexual Stereotyping in Sexual 
Orientation Asylum Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135, 139 (2006). 
 43. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Preamble and Article I, ¶ 2, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 40, at 588. 
 44. Morgan, supra note 42, at 140.  
 45. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1996); see also MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 76–77. 
 46. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42), An alien will be considered a refugee if she has suffered persecution in the 
past on account of one of the statutory grounds or if she can show an objectively reasonable fear of such 
persecution in the future. Id. See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427–28 (1987). If the alien 
establishes past persecution, moreover, a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of granting asylum. Draganova v. 
INS, 82 F.3d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1996). Yet that presumption may be overcome by evidence suggesting that 
conditions in the alien’s home country have changed to such an extent that she no longer is in danger of 
persecution there. Id. at 722. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i)(A) (2000). 
 47. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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B.   Eligibility for Asylum 
The legal remedy of asylum is available to noncitizens legally in the United 
States and to undocumented noncitizens seeking protection from persecution they 
faced or would face in their home country on account of one of the several specific 
protected grounds.
50
 Thus, not all immigrants are protected from persecution.
51
 
Rather, the persecution must have a connection to the specific protected 
characteristics, race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
“particular social group.”
52
 An asylum request is automatically considered as an 
application for an alternate claim of relief known as “withholding of removal.”
53
 
Both forms of relief require the claimant to demonstrate a certain quantum of 
persecution that the individual suffered in his or her home country or would suffer 
if returned there, and both require a “nexus” between the persecution and one of 
the protected grounds.
54
 In 1996, an amendment to the INA mandated that a claim 
of asylum must be made within one year of arriving in the United States.
55
 
While the legal concepts of asylum and withholding of removal appear nearly 
identical, they have important differences. Asylum is subject to the discretion of 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security or Attorney General of the 
United States.
56
 Whereas, withholding of removal, if proven, is a mandatory form 
of relief.
57
 A person granted asylum may be eligible for permanent residency.
58
 
Most litigants prefer asylum.
59
 A grant of asylum will allow the applicant, after a 
one-year stay in the United States, to adjust his or her status to that of a legal 
permanent resident.
60
 Withholding of removal guarantees only that the person will 
not be forcibly returned to his or her country of origin and does not preclude the 
possibility of being removed to a third country.
61
 The applicable standard of proof 
is also higher in a withholding of removal than in an asylum grant.
62
 In order to 
 ________________________  
 50. See Joseph Landau, Soft Immutability and Imputed Gay Identity: Recent Developments in Transgender 
and Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237, 239–40 (2005). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 53. This provision of the law is found at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006) and was formerly known as 
“withholding of deportation.” The amendments to the INA in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act replaced former hearings known as Deportation Hearings and Exclusion Hearings and renamed 
them both as Removal Hearings. Removal is synonymous with deportation. The concept of deportation is readily 
recognized by most people. 
 54. Landau, supra note 50, at 241. 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (1996). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). “The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant 
asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with requirements and procedures by the Secretary 
of Homeland Security or the Attorney General.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A). “The Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney 
General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2005). 
 59. Landau, supra note 50, at 241. 
 60. See 8 U.S.C. §1159(b). A legal permanent resident is awarded what is known as “green card” status 
which allows them to remain in the United States indefinitely on good behavior. 
 61. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 350 
(6th ed. 2010). 
 62. Id.  
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obtain a withholding of removal, the claimant must show a clear probability of 
persecution.
63
 The showing for asylum is only a well-founded fear of persecution.
64
 
There are only two types of applications for asylum; which are termed either 
“affirmative” applications or “defensive” applications. Asylum applicants, 
applicants for withholding of removal, and applicants seeking relief under the 
Convention Against Torture who are not currently under immigration deportation 
proceedings, but have a fear of persecution if they return to their homeland, may 
file an “affirmative” application by mailing a Form I-589
65
 to a regional USCIS
66
 
service center under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).
67
 A specialized corps of full-time professional asylum officers receives the 
applications and interviews the applicants. Asylum officers grant asylum in 
meritorious cases, which initially ran between fifteen and thirty percent, but in 
recent years have exceeded forty percent.
68
 They do not deny the other cases; 
instead, asylum officers refer them to the immigration court, placing the cases in 
removal proceedings.
69
 Once in removal (deportation) proceedings, those 
applicants who did not receive a grant of asylum with respect to their “affirmative” 
application may now renew their application for asylum by renewing their request 
for asylum as a “defensive” application.
70
 The “affirmative” I-589 application 
becomes a part of the immigration court record. For those individuals placed in 
removal proceedings who never filed an “affirmative” application and who believe 
they may have a claim for asylum, withholding of removal, or a claim for relief 
under the Convention Against Torture, will be allowed to submit an application 
Form I-589 as a “defensive” application for relief.
71
 
C.   Immigration Court Proceedings, Appeal and Review 
Immigration judges provide the initial evaluation of all “defensive” 
applications for asylum, withholding, and provide a second review of “affirmative” 
 ________________________  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Most applicants seeking some form of immigration benefit must file an immigration application or 
petition. The correct form for applicants seeking asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention 
Against Torture is Form “I-589.” Such application may be downloaded at no charge from the website of the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., I-589, Application for 
Asylum and Withholding of Removal, http://www.uscis.gov/i-589 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
 66. This is the abbreviation for the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of 
Homeland Security. “Created in 2003, this bureau houses the principle services and adjudications functions 
inherited from the Immigration and Naturalization Service [(INS)], including asylum officers and the refugee 
corps.” MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at xi. See also UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., Our 
History, http://www.uscis.gov (follow “ABOUT US” hyperlink; then follow “Our History” hyperlink) (last 
updated May 25, 2011). It is sometimes referred to as CIS. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at xi. 
 67. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 79. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., Obtaining Asylum in the United States, 
http://www.uscis.gov (follow “Humanitarian” hyperlink; then follow “Refugee Status & Asylum” hyperlink; then 
follow “Asylum” hyperlink; then follow “Obtaining Asylum in the United States” hyperlink) (last updated Mar. 
10, 2011). 
 71. Id.  
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applications referred by asylum officers.
72
 In the latter situation, the immigration 
judge receives the pre-existing I-589, with its attachments, from the asylum officer, 
along with copies of the “charging document.”
73
 Applicants are allowed to 
supplement their claim in immigration court and put on additional witnesses.
74
 This 
allows the case to be heard in the more formal setting of the immigration court 
where witnesses may be examined and cross-examined by the asylum seekers’ 
counsel and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) counsel.
75
 To be clear, if 
removal (deportation) proceedings are already underway, the applicants can apply 
for asylum or withholding only by presenting “defensive” applications that are 
heard exclusively by the immigration judges.
76
 
At the hearing, the claimant must present evidence to avoid removal 
(deportation). The DHS will present evidence and argument in support of its 
decision to refuse asylum.
77
 Evidence presented must be relevant and conform to 
requirements of constitutional due process.
78
 The burden of proof is on the 
applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of the 
statute and that they will be persecuted because of one of the five protected 
grounds.
79
 If the claimant persuades the immigration judge that she meets the 
statute’s asylum requirements, then the judge may grant asylum for an indefinite 
amount of time.
80
 In addition, the claimant’s immediate family members who are 
still abroad may join her in the United States.
81
 
However, if the immigration judge denies the asylum request, the applicant 
may appeal his or her case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
82
 The BIA 
reviews all appeals from immigration courts throughout the United States.
83
 The 
BIA is an administrative appeals tribunal that is part of the EOIR Review in the 
Department of Justice.
84
 The BIA has never been recognized by congressional 
statute; it is entirely a creature of the Attorney General’s regulations, and the 
Attorney General appoints its members.
85
 The BIA has several options with respect 
 ________________________  
 72. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 81. 
 73. The “charging document” in an immigration case is called a “Notice To Appear.” It serves the purpose 
of advising the noncitizen what immigration laws he or she has violated and functions much like an indictment or 
information in a criminal case by providing the specifics, dates of, and sections of the immigration law violated. 
 74. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 81. 
 75. Id. at 80. See id. x.: ICE – Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland 
Security. Created in 2003, this bureau houses interior enforcement functions transferred from the former INS, 
including investigations, detention and removal, and the trial attorneys who represent the government in 
Immigration Court.  
 76. Id. at 80. Typically the alien makes known at the master calendar hearing (the first appearance in 
Immigration Court) her wish to seek asylum or withholding as a form of relief from removal, and the judge then 
grants a specified period of time for the completion of the Form I-589 to be filed with the Immigration Court. 
 77. See Alan G. Bennett, The “Cure” That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum and the Changing 
Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 279, 284 (1999). 
 78. Id. 
 79. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
 80. See Bennett, supra note 77, at 284. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 83. 
 85. Id. 
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to the appeals: it may reject the claim on appeal, remand a case to the IJ with 
instructions to follow an appropriate course of action, or it may grant asylum 
directly.
86
 Although the BIA hands down a large volume of appellate decisions 
each year, only a small fraction are designated as precedential decisions each year 
for inclusions in official reports.
87
 
If the BIA rules against the claim, an applicant may appeal to the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the circuit in which the case originated.
88
 The circuit court may then 
remand the case to the BIA with instructions for a ruling consistent with the circuit 
court’s findings.
89
 Furthermore, if a circuit adopts a different rule than the BIA, the 
new rule will be applied within the circuit court in future cases.
90
 As a result, 
circuit splits have arisen because of inconsistent rulings among the circuit courts 
regarding the same legal issue.
91
 
D.   Recent Statistics on Grants of Asylum 
The Department of Homeland Security discloses information about the 
numbers of asylum grants and denials but it does not disclose much information 
about the characteristics of asylum seekers.
92
 Currently, the number of asylum 
seekers in immigration court is declining slightly but more are being granted 
asylum.
93
 In recent years, approximately forty percent of those seeking asylum 
through an affirmative filing are granted asylum.
94
 Similarly, fifty percent of those 
who pursue their claim for asylum defensively receive grants of asylum.
95
 
The total number of persons who were granted asylum in the United States 
decreased from 22,832 in 2008, to 22,090 in 2009, and in 2010 the number of 
grants decreased again to 21,113.
96
 The number of persons who were granted 
asylum affirmatively through USCIS decreased from 11,904 in 2009 to 11,244 in 
2010.
97
 The number of persons granted asylum defensively through an immigration 
court judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals of the EOIR decreased from 
10,186 in 2009 to 9,869 in 2010.
98
 The leading countries of origin for persons 
granted asylum in 2010 were China (32%), Ethiopia (5.2%), Haiti (3.9%), 
 ________________________  
 86. See Bennett, supra note 77, at 285. 
 87. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 83. 
 88. See Bennett, supra note 77, at 285. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally Daniel C. Martin & James E. Yankay, Refugees and Asylees: 2012 (April 2013), 
available at http://www. http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2012.pdf. 
 93. See TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Asylum Denial Rate Reaches All Time Low: FY 2010 Results, a Twenty-
Five Year Perspective, TRAC Immigration (Sept. 2, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240 [hereinafter 
TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., All Time Low]. 
 94. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 79. 
 95. Id. at 80. 
 96. See Daniel C. Martin, Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2010, DHS 5 (May 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2010.pdf. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Venezuela (3.1%), and Nepal (3%).
99
 These five countries accounted for forty-
seven percent of the persons granted asylum.
100
 In 2010, the top three countries of 
nationality for affirmative asylum seekers were China (26%), Ethiopia (6.1%), and 
Haiti (5.9%) accounting for thirty-eight percent of all persons granted asylum 
affirmatively.
101
 The leading countries of nationality of persons granted defensive 
asylum in immigration courts were China (39%), Ethiopia (4.1%), India (2.4%), 
Colombia (2.4%), and Nepal (2.3%).
102
 Approximately fifty percent of defensive 
asylum seekers in 2010 were nationals of these five countries.
103
 
Demographic data from this same 2010 report only includes information 
concerning affirmative asylum seekers. Seventy-six percent of persons granted 
asylum affirmatively in 2010 were between the ages eighteen and forty-four.
104
 
Affirmative asylum seekers are, on average, younger than the native born U.S. 
population: the median age of persons granted affirmative asylum was twenty-
nine,
105
 while the median age for United States citizens is thirty-seven.
106
 Fifty-two 
percent were male, and forty-four percent were married.
107
  
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data research and 
data distribution organization at Syracuse University, has issued several 
immigration reports based upon detailed studies of our immigration court system. 
Its 2010 report reveals that denial rates for asylum seekers have reached the lowest 
level in the last quarter of a century.
108
 They report that twenty-five years ago, in 
fiscal year (FY) 1989, almost nine out of ten (89%) of the asylum requests were 
denied.
109
 While the annual rates have gone up and down during the ensuing years, 
only fifty percent of the requests were denied during the first nine months of FY 
2010, a record low.
110
 
The TRAC report reveals that one factor contributing to the improved success 
of recent asylum seekers is that a higher proportion were represented by counsel.
111
 
It should also be noted that the number of those seeking asylum in court 
proceedings have fallen. What TRAC does not report is that the 1996 INA asylum 
amendments made it more difficult to apply for asylum. Among these changes was 
 ________________________  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. The largest percentages of individuals granted asylum in 2010 affirmatively were living in 
California (37%), New York (15%), and Florida (13%). Id. at 6. Approximately two-thirds of individuals granted 
affirmative asylum resided in these three states. Martin, supra note 96, at 6. Other major states included Virginia 
(4%), Maryland (3.5%), Washington (3.0%), and Illinois (2.5%). Id. 
 101. Martin, supra note 96, at 5. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Median Age: United States, The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/united_states/median_age.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 107. See Martin, supra note 96, at 5. 
 108. See TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., All Time Low, supra note 93. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. TRAC reports that the latest FY 2010 figures reveal that more than nine out of every ten (91%) are 
now represented by counsel, up from just more than half (52%) twenty-five years ago in FY 1986. Id. 
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the one-year limitation rule.
112
 Prior to this amendment, one could be in the United 
States legally or illegally for an unlimited time and apply for asylum. One must 
now file within one year of entry into the United States.
113
  
Also, prior to the 1996 amendments, the law provided that one could apply for 
a work authorization sixty days after filing a claim for asylum. This led to a flood 
of specious and frivolous asylum claims by noncitizens seeking to work legally in 
the United States even though they had no genuine fear of persecution. The 1996 
amendment extended the authorization period to six months after filing a claim for 




Another way to observe the total magnitude of defensive asylum filings and 
decisions comes to us from the EOIR. It measures immigration court statistics on a 
fiscal year basis which are divided into the following categories: “[r]eceived, 
[g]ranted, [d]enied, [a]bandoned, [w]ithdrawn or some [o]ther” disposition.
115
 In 




Immigration judges granted asylum in 11,528 of these cases and denied asylum 
in 10,573 cases.
117
 Respondents abandoned 1,577 cases.
118
 Another 5,920 cases 
were withdrawn
119
 and a whopping 10,966 asylum cases were disposed of by other 
means.
120
 Anecdotal experience in immigration court allows me to offer my 
opinion that the majority of the 10,966 asylum “[o]ther” cases involved applicants 
who were granted voluntary departure,
121
 the most frequently granted form of 
discretionary relief granted under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
E.   The History of the Immigration Courts  
As explained briefly above, in Part II.B and II.C of this article, our immigration 
courts are the “trial level” administrative bodies responsible for conducting 
removal hearings—that is, hearings to determine whether noncitizens may remain 
in the United States. For asylum seekers with attorneys, such hearings are 
 ________________________  
 112. Immigration Equality Asylum Manual: Section 5. Immigration Basics: The One-Year Filing Deadline, 
available at http://immigrationequality.org/issues/law-library/lgbth-asylum-manual/one-year-deadline/ (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2014). 
 113. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 114. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2006). 
 115. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, 
Immigration Courts FY 2011 Asylum Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 7 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FY11AsyStats-Current.pdf. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Voluntary Departure is a form of discretionary relief that allows immigration judges to grant otherwise 
removable aliens to depart the United States at their own expense. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. 
Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes Across Immigration Courts and Judges 16 n.16 
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281794.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Asylum System]. They may be 
barred from reentering the United States for up to ten years and be subjected to civil and criminal penalties if they 
fail to depart or reenter without proper authorization. Id.  
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conducted like other court hearings, with direct and cross-examination of the 
asylum seeker, testimony from supporting witnesses where available, and opening 
and closing statements by both the government and the respondent.
122
 
Approximately one-third of asylum seekers in immigration court are not 
represented by counsel.
123
 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the 
Federal Rules of Evidence apply in immigration court.
124
 
Prior to 1956, “special inquiry officers,” who were the predecessors to 
immigration judges, held hearings only as part of a range of immigration duties that 
included adjudicating deportation proceedings.
125
 These officers were retitled 
“immigration judges” in 1973.
126
 Until 1983, immigration courts were part of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was also responsible for 
enforcement of immigration laws and housed the INS trial attorneys who opposed 
asylum claims in court.
127
 In January of 1983, the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) was created, placing the immigration courts in a separate agency 
within the U.S. Department of Justice.
128
 In 2003, when the Department of 
Homeland Security was created, the trial attorneys became part of the new agency, 
but the immigration courts remained in the Department of Justice.
129
 
Asylum cases are assigned to immigration courts according to the asylum 
seekers’ geographic residence.
130
 The administrators in each immigration court 
randomly assign cases to immigration judges to distribute the workload evenly 
among them and without regard to the merits of the case or the strength of defenses 
to removal that may be asserted by the respondents.
131
 
F.   Appointment of Immigration Judges and Qualifications 
Immigration judges are attorneys appointed under Schedule A of the excepted 
service who are managed by EOIR.
132
 Schedule A is a civil service designation for 
an appointed career employee as provided in the Code of Federal Regulations.
133
 
Three processes have been used to hire immigration judges: (1) the Attorney 
General directly appoints the immigration judge, or directs the appointment 
without a recommendation by EOIR; (2) the immigration judge is appointed after 
directly responding to an announcement for an immigration judge and submitting 
the appropriate documentation; or (3) EOIR identifies a need and vacancies are 
 ________________________  
 122. See Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 325. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 325 n.48. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 325. 
 128. Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 325–26. 
 129. Id. at 326. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. Unlike in federal court where the merits of certain cases may warrant that the case be assigned to a 
U.S. magistrate judge or to a senior judge, it has always been assumed in the immigration court system that each 
and every immigration judge has the knowledge and experience to properly apply his or her discretion in deciding 
any asylum case assigned. 
 132. See U.S. Asylum System, supra note 121, at 17 n.20.  
 133. See id. at 17 n.21.  
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filled from EOIR personnel or sitting immigration judges who requested and 
obtained the vacancy.
134
 Except for direct appointment by the Attorney General, to 




The applicant must have a law degree; be duly licensed and authorized to 
practice law as an attorney under the laws of a state, territory, or the District of 
Columbia; be a United States citizen and have a minimum of seven years relevant 
post-bar admission legal experience at the time the application is submitted, with 
one year experience at the GS-15 level in the federal service.
136
 According to 
EOIR, the DOJ looks for experience in at least three of the following areas: 
substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high volume context; knowledge 
of immigration laws and procedure; experience handling complex legal issues; 




III.  THE IMMIGRATION COURTS AND THEIR PROBLEMS 
A.   Immigration Court Problems 
While asylum decisions should always be fair and impartial, this is not always 
the case given the wide discretion immigration judges are given in deciding such 
cases, the lack of precedential decisions, and the fact that many of the immigration 
judges have come from the enforcement arm of the immigration service, and that 
are all hired by the Attorney General of the United States. These factors necessarily 
place the institutional role of immigration judges in conflict with expectations of 
fairness and impartiality in deciding asylum cases. Those who are new to 
immigration court practice and unacquainted with the workings of immigration 
court often fail to understand why the immigration courts function so differently 
than our Article III, Article I, and state courts. In order for a wider world to 
understand how the immigration courts function and why they should be converted 
into Article I courts, it is important to reveal and discuss some of the recent 
problems in the immigration courts.  
During the last decade, our immigration courts have wrestled with disparate 
asylum outcomes, both among the various immigration courts, and within the same 
immigration courts, an immigration judge hiring scandal between 2004 and 2006 
that left many immigration positions vacant; the implementation of a twenty-two 
point plan to improve the functioning of the immigration court; the backlog of the 
 ________________________  
 134. Id. at 17.  
 135. Id. 5 C.F.R section 6.3(a) allows the head of an agency to fill excepted service positions by 
appointment of persons without civil service eligibility or competitive status. Id. at 17 n.21. Schedule A positions 
are “positions other than those of a confidential or policy determining character” and are considered career 
positions. The authority to appoint an Immigration Judge is vested in the Attorney General pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(b)(4). Id.  
 136. U.S. Asylum System, supra note 121, at 17 n.23. 
 137. Id.  
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immigration caseload beginning in 2005; and the perpetual need to standardize 
immigration court rules and procedures. 
1.   Disparate Asylum Outcomes 
Immigration practitioners, such as myself, often believed that asylum seekers 
were not receiving proper justice because of the disparities in grants of asylum at 
the trial level in the various immigration courts. Moreover, there were often 
disparities in outcomes within the same immigration courts.
138
 The drafters of the 
Asylum Study examined asylum outcomes in immigration courts from 2000 through 
2004 for asylum seekers from what they consider Asylum Producing Countries 
(APC).
139
 “They discovered that even for asylum seekers from countries that 
produce a relatively high percentage of successful asylees, there are serious 
disparities among immigration courts in the rates at which they grant asylum to 




The drafters of the Asylum Study opine that the “explanation for the differences 
between the courts could be simply cultural”—some courts are more likely to grant 
asylum, while others may be especially tough on all asylum seekers.
141
 Also, 
differences from one region “may be due to differences in the populations of 
asylum seekers in different geographic locations.”
142
 An example may be that 
immigration judges in the Miami court may be more acquainted with the type of 
persecution alleged by asylum seekers from Venezuela and Colombia, while the 
same judge might not be as acquainted with or comfortable deciding persecution 
cases involving Ethiopians who seldom might appear in that court. Conversely, an 
immigration judge in the Chicago court may well be more acquainted with the type 
of persecution suffered by Ethiopian asylum seekers that often appear in that court, 
as opposed to Venezuelans and Colombians who seldom seek asylum in the 
Chicago immigration court. 
These explanations may be true, but the question remains: is true justice being 
properly served with respect to asylum seekers, or are they being subjected to 
“refugee roulette?” 
 ________________________  
 138. The Asylum Study examined disparities in outcome by immigration officers in affirmative filing cases, 
the immigration courts, the circuit courts of appeal, and the Board of Immigration Appeal. See Asylum Study, 
supra note 16. This article focuses only on the disparities among and within the immigration courts.  
 139. Asylum-producing countries in the Asylum Study were countries that had at least 5,000 asylum claims 
before the immigration courts in FY 2004, and a national grant rate of at least thirty percent. See Asylum Study, 
supra note 16, at 312. Asylum officer and immigration court judges have reached a consensus that many of the 
applicants from these countries are bona fide refugees. Id. The fifteen countries meeting these criteria were: 
Albania, Armenia, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, India, Liberia, Mauritania, Pakistan, 
Russia, Togo, and Venezuela. Id. 
 140. Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 328. 
 141. Id. at 331. 
 142. Id. 
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2.   Possible Causes of Disparities Among Immigration Judges 
Judging can be difficult in any forum. It is especially difficult with respect to 
asylum claims because the required persecution must have taken place in a foreign 
country and may have occurred a great while ago with few witnesses and little 
documentation. Furthermore, immigration judges are required to make credibility 
determinations in each case, and the applicants’ credibility may be suspect.  
The Asylum Study investigated grant rate disparities within the same 
immigration courts by looking at the eight largest courts by volume
143
 and 
observing only judges who had decided 100 or more cases.
144
 Only in the case of 
these judges did the study analyze discrepancies in grant rates for asylum seekers 
from APCs. “With the national APC mean of forty percent as a starting point, 
[they] determined for each court how many judges’ APC grant rates were more 
than fifty percent deviant from the mean.”
145
 
“The statistics revealed that the five largest courts [had] consistent outliers.”
146
 
“From one-third to three-quarters of the judges on these courts grant asylum in 
[APC] cases at rates more than [fifty percent] greater or more than [fifty percent] 
less than the national average.”
147
 The authors of the study arrived at the conclusion 
that discrepancies in the grant rates between judges in the same court may be 
because of different geographic populations of asylum seekers in different 
regions.
148
 It may also be that certain asylum seekers may come from certain ethnic 
groups that have similarly viable asylum claims.
149
 By way of example, Ethiopia 
has three large ethnic groups, the Amhara, the Tigray, and the Oromo. Members of 
each ethnic group might seek asylum in one of our immigration courts. Much is 
known about Ethiopians in many immigration courts. The Amhara people have 
traditionally been the ruling class of the country for 2,000 years. An Amhara 
seeking asylum in the United States based on persecution because of race, religion, 
 ________________________  
 143. Id. at 332. The eight courts are: the Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York, 
Orlando, and San Francisco immigration courts. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 332–33. 
 146. Id. at 333. 
 147. Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 333. The authors of the study explain,  
The fact that these judges’ decisions are not necessarily inaccurate simply because their 
grant rates are discrepant with the nation average. It could be, for example, that a judge with 
an unusually high grant rate is deciding cases as fairly as possible, and that the average grant 
rate is inaccurate because a plethora of low granting judges are not deciding cases as fairly 
as the high granting outlier judge . . . . To be clear we are not advocating that judges be 
disciplined or otherwise sanctioned based solely on discrepant grant rates, but instead that 
the data may be a jumping off points for a more thorough examination of performance and 
professionalism in the courtroom. 
Id. n.65. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. For example, Ethiopians may all have better claims for asylum because of the upheavals and 
changes in government in that country over the last thirty years. Likewise, asylum seekers from a country such as 
Sudan, where northern Sudanese have perpetrated atrocities of southern Sudanese over the last thirty years, 
persons from south Sudan would probably have more viable claims for asylum than those from the north of the 
country. 
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nationality, particular social group, or political opinion would more often than not 
have a more difficult time of proving such persecution. Whereas, an Oromo may 
well have a better claim for persecution based on one of the five grounds because 
they have traditionally been a disfavored ethnic group whom many in the country 
refer to as the “slave” class. Many Oromos are Muslim in a majority Christian 
country. Many Oromos disapprove of the present government in Ethiopia and 
many of them have sought secession to form their own country. In essence, 
Oromos might have similarly viable asylum claims that would make them better 
candidates for asylum than applicants of the Amhara or Tigray ethnic groups. 
As a result of finding such discrepancies within the same court, the authors of 
the Asylum Study “performed a descriptive analysis ‘using cross-tabulations’ of 
decisions of the judges during” the time-frame of the study.
150
 They “examined a 
number of variables to determine their impact on judges’ grant rates: whether the 
asylum seeker was represented [by counsel], the number of dependents the asylum 
seeker had, the gender of the judge, and the prior work experience of the judge.”
151
 
The result of their analysis revealed that the single most important factor affecting 
the outcome of an asylum seeker’s case was whether she was represented.
152
 
“Represented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three 
times higher than the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel.”
153
 “The 
number of dependents that an asylum seeker brought with her to the United States 
played a . . . large role in increasing the chance of an asylum grant.”
154
 Their 
analysis found that an asylum seeker with no dependents has a 42.3% grant rate,
155
 
and having one dependent increases the grant rate to 48.2%.
156
 The authors opine it 
could be that asylum seekers who bring children in addition to a spouse appear 
more credible; in other cases, they opine some immigration judges are more 
sympathetic to asylum seekers who have a family to protect.
157
 
The authors found “that the gender of the judge had a significant impact on the 
likelihood that asylum would be granted.”
158
 “Female immigration judges granted 
asylum at a rate of 53.8%, while male judges granted asylum at a rate of 37.3%.”
159
 
The statistical calculations show that an asylum seeker whose case is assigned to a 
female judge had a forty-four percent better chance of prevailing than if his or her 
case was assigned to a male judge.
160
 This may be significant in that there are far 
fewer female immigration judges than male judges; approximately thirty-five 
percent of the 263 immigration judges are women.
161
  
 ________________________  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 340. 
 153. Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 340. 
 154. Id. at 341. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 342. 
 159. Asylum Study, supra note 16 at 342. 
 160. Id.  
 161. See EOIR Immigration Court Listings, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012). At the bottom of this web page are listed all of the immigration courts and the names 
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This may be because the majority of immigration judges have been involved 
with immigration enforcement work before becoming immigration judges. There 
have always been fewer women who have worked in immigration enforcement.
162
 
Since the women who do become judges have usually not been involved in 
immigration enforcement, it is perceived that they are more prone to give an 
asylum applicant a more fair and impartial hearing. A practitioner who draws a 
female immigration judge in any asylum case may understand that statistically he 
or she has a better chance of prevailing and gaining a grant of asylum than with a 
male immigration judge.  
It has been my anecdotal experience and observation that during the era of the 
old INS, women were either not interested in or were not encouraged to partake in 
the law enforcement work that entailed patrolling the border, deporting people, or 
interviewing, inspecting, and screening noncitizens at our ports of entry. It is not 
difficult for one to believe that many people who were involved with INS 
immigration enforcement work developed a mindset against asylum seekers. It 
begins in training wherein immigration officers and State Department consular 
officers are taught that many people wish to come to the United States for many 
reasons, and it is easier to say “no” to their visa, their entry, or their request for 
asylum if there is any doubt concerning their credibility, their documentation, or 
their motives for entry. I know this because I received the same such training 
before taking up my duties as head of the Nonimmigrant Visa Section at the United 
States Consulate in Hamburg, Germany.
163
 It is a type of training that fosters a 
mindset of erring on the side of saying “no” much more often than saying “yes.” It 
is what I call a “law enforcement mindset.” Trainees are advised starting their first 
day that they will seldom be chastised for saying “no” to applicants about whom 
they may have a doubt, but if they issue a visa to a person who later turns out to be 
a terrorist or assassin, their job may well be jeopardized. I know well from our 
conversations that immigration officers with whom I have worked received the 
very same message in their training. It is difficult for me not to believe that many 
of those immigration officers who became immigration judges still operated with 
this “law enforcement mindset.” It is just easier to say “no” if one has a doubt. At 
the end of immigration officer training and State Department training, each officer 
is provided a document which confers on them executive power to make 
immigration and consular decisions as to who may be issued a visa for entry to our 
country; decisions as to who may be allowed to enter the country; and decisions as 
to who may be deported from the country. This document confers absolute 
executive officer power to make such immigration decisions without oversight by, 
  
of each judge on each court. A count of the names reveals there are ninety-four female judges out of a total of 263 
immigration judges. 
 162. As stated in note 25, this is a personal observation gained through the author’s earlier career experience 
as a U.S. State Department Foreign Service officer who sometimes worked closely with immigration enforcement 
officers. Most of the enforcement officers were men. Some went on to be immigration judges. 
 163. The author was the head of the Nonimmigrant Visa Section of the U.S. Consulate in Hamburg, 
Germany for 1986, 1987, and 1988, during which he oversaw the issuance of 330,000 U.S. nonimmigrant visas to 
citizens from approximately eighty different countries. 
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or appeal to, the courts of the United States.
164
 In the U.S. State Department, the 
document that confers such executive power on consular officers is called an 
“exequatur.”
165
 For some, this “law enforcement mindset” of being able to say “no” 
to any applicant at the executive level without judicial oversight is quite heady and, 
I believe, it carries over to the conduct and decision making of many former law 
enforcement officials who have become immigration judges.  
Finally, in this regard, further examination by the authors of the Asylum Study 
found prior work experience by male and female judges was revealing. Among 
other things, the authors “found that prior work experience of all types had a 
significant impact on a judge’s grant rate.”
166
 “Judges with prior government 
experience (excluding work for INS or DHS) granted asylum at a rate of 39.6%, 




3.   The EOIR Hiring Scandal 
In the early 2000s the case-loads of the country’s immigration courts were 
rising while the number of immigration judges was simultaneously declining.
168
 
The EOIR asked Congress for additional funding to hire more immigration 
judges.
169
 However, the reputation of the EOIR was tarnished by the discovery of 
an illegal political hiring scandal that took place from Spring 2004 until December 
2006.
170
 “The Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General released a 
report on July 28, 2008 confirming that the [Bush Administration Justice 
Department] used an illegal [selection] process to exclusively appoint immigration 
judges who had been screened for their political or ideological affiliations during 
that time.”
171
 The report maintained, in relevant part that 
[o]ne of the results of this tightly controlled selection process [by 
DOJ political appointees] was that it left numerous [immigration 
judge] vacancies unfilled for long periods of time when they could 
not find enough candidates, even when EOIR pleaded for more 
judges and told the [Office of the Attorney General] repeatedly 




 ________________________  
 164. This power of executive delegation in immigration matters was first recognized in the case of 
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1903). 
 165. This author’s exequatur was issued on July 1985 and was signed by then President Ronald Reagan and 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz. 
 166. Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 345. 
 167. Id. 
 168. TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Improving the Immigration Courts: Effort to Hire More Judges Falls Short 
(July 28, 2008), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/189/. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. The report found  
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Finally, an analysis of the asylum decisions by the sixteen judges 
who were appointed after consideration of their political 
credentials and who had decided at least 100 matters found that, on 
average, they were more likely to rule against asylum seekers than 
their colleagues on the same court who had been appointed 
according to the Justice Department’s politically neutral rule.
174
  
“The report covering the selection of immigration judges primarily blamed 
Kyle Sampson, a former top aide to the Attorney General, and two former White 
House liaisons to the Justice Department, Monica M. Goodling and Jan Williams,” 
for taking political affiliation into account when hiring immigration judges.
175
 
“When vetting applicants . . . Ms. Goodling asked them questions about their 
political beliefs and researched their campaign contributions.”
176
 “She also 
conducted [i]nternet searches of their names and words like “asylum,” 
“immigrant,” and “border,” as well as partisan terms, like abortion, Iraq, gay, and 
the names of political figures, to determine their views.”
177
 
Ms. Goodling “solicited and received résumés for [immigration judges] and 
BIA candidates from the White House, from Republican members of Congress, the 
Republican National Lawyers Association, the Federalist Society, and from others 
with Republican Party affiliations.”
178
 There was “no evidence that she solicited 
candidates from any sources she thought had Democratic affiliations.”
179
 “Evidence 
demonstrated that [Ms.] Goodling violated department policy and federal law, and 
committed misconduct, by considering political or ideological affiliations in the 
appointment of [immigration judges] and BIA members.”
180
 “Goodling admitted in 
her congressional testimony that she ‘took political consideration into account’ in 
immigration judge hiring.”
181  “She [also] stated that Sampson had told her that 
  
[t]hat a hiring freeze went into effect in January, 2007, after DOJ civil division attorneys 
investigated the immigration hiring process, and a new hiring process was implemented on 
April 2, 2007. The report also quotes EOIR Director Kevin Ohlson as saying that 
‘candidates have been selected, but not yet appointed, for [twenty-one] of the remaining 
[twenty-seven] vacancies.’ 
Id. 
 173. TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Bush Administration Plan to Improve Immigration Courts Lags (Sept. 8, 
2008), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Charlie Savage, Vetted Judges More Likely to Reject Asylum Bids, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008, at A17, 
available at www.nytimes.com/2008/08/24/washington/24judges.html?. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN 
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE 
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 121 (July 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
20
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/2
Fall 2013 Reforming Immigration Courts 37 
 
[immigration judge] hiring was not subject to civil service laws, and that she 
‘assumed’ those laws did not apply to BIA member hiring.”
182 
The Department of 




The immigration judge hiring scandal was unfortunate. It is my sincere hope 
that politically neutral guidelines and a new crop of immigration judges will help 
restore the integrity of the immigration court judiciary. The scandal of hiring 
immigration judges for their political position or political belief does disservice to 
the idea of a court that is to be fair and impartial when making decisions 
concerning applicants who are fleeing persecution. Such judges should be above 
reproach. 
4.   The Attorney General’s 2006 Plan for Reform 
In the wake of the hiring scandal and criticism from several federal circuit 
court rulings that sharply criticized the immigration courts, former Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzalez issued a twenty-two point plan for improving the 
operation of the immigration courts.
184
 It is not the objective of this article to delve 
deeply into the implementation of the entire reform effort, but the article will 
briefly examine some of the positive changes that have emerged from its 
implementation and discuss what else could be done.
185
 
On June 5, 2009, the EOIR produced a Fact Sheet detailing measures to 
improve the EOIR.
186
 According to the 2009 Fact Sheet, fifteen of the twenty-two 
proposed reforms had been enacted. These included: obtaining funding to hire 
additional immigration judges and field supervisors for immigration courts;
187
 
drafting an immigration examination for all new judges;
188
 installing digital 
 ________________________  
 182. Id. at 122. 
 183. See Savage, supra note 175. 
 184. Press Release, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzalez Outlines Reforms for 
Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf. 
 185. A summary of the reforms by number may be found at, TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Supporting Details: 
Implementation of the 22 Improvement Measures (Sept. 8, 2008), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/details.html. 
The Proposed Reforms by Number: (1) Performance Evaluations for IJ’s; (2) New IJ Judge 
Evaluations; (3) Immigration Law Exam for new IJ’s; (4) Improved training for Judges; (5) 
Improved training for EOIR staff; (6) Improved Reference Material; (7) Detecting Poor 
Conduct/Quality; (8) Asylum Rate Disparities; (9) Deploying Supervisors to the Field; (10) 
Code of Conduct; (11) Complaint Procedures; (12) Streamlining Reforms; (13) Practice 
Manual; (14) Sanction Authority for IJ’s; (15) Sanction Authority for BIA; (16) Additional 
Judges and Staff; (17) Increase Size of BIA; (18) Digital Recording System; (19) Improved 
Transcription; (20) Improved Interpreters; (21) Fraud and Abuse; and (22) Pro Bono 
Programs.  
Id.  
 186. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet: EOIR’s Improvement 
Measures—Update (June 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/EOIRs22ImprovementsProgress060509FINAL.pdf. 
 187. Id. at 4. This included 5 million dollars in FY 2009 to hire more judges and field supervisors. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1. 
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recording services in most, but not all, the immigration courtrooms;
189
 and 
producing an online practice manual for the immigration court.
190
 The reforms also 
included training for new judges and additional training for current judges.
191
 As of 
July 2012, no sanctions have been granted to the immigration judges or the judges 
of the BIA to hold attorneys or parties in contempt.
192
 
The training plans consisted of expanded training for new immigration judges 
on legal and procedural issues, a mentoring program for new judges, and periodic 
training on management.
193
 For the first time there was a joint legal conference in 
2009 for immigration judges and BIA members.
194
 
The Code of Conduct had been implemented in 2011 under the Obama 
Administration as well as the completion of installation of digital audio recording 
systems in all of the immigration courtrooms.
195
 
There is statistical evidence that the reforms have helped. “The central finding 
of [a 2009 TRAC] report [contends] that judge-by-judge asylum disparities in the 
Immigration Courts are down.”
196
 Court data shows that disparity rates have 
declined in ten of fifteen immigration courts that decide the bulk of all asylum 
matters.
197
 In New York, the disparity rate among judges in asylum cases has 
dropped by a quarter, and in Miami the range among judges in their denial rates 
dropped almost two-thirds from their previous levels.
198
 This indicates that justice 
is being better served for asylum seekers in these busy immigration courts. 
If disparity rates have declined in ten of the fifteen immigration courts that hear 
the bulk of asylum claims, this is real progress toward a fairer and more impartial 
system. Training for new immigration judges and the judicial mentoring programs 
have helped many new judges take their cases more seriously. It is my 
understanding, from visiting the two immigration courts in  Summer 2012,
199
 that 
new judges are now allowed to visit other immigration courts and to sit in on 
asylum cases to observe how they are adjudicated—a form of judicial education 
 ________________________  
 189. Id. at 4. 
 190. Id. at 3. 
 191. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 186, at 1. 
 192. Infra note 197. Telecom with Kathryn Mattingly in the office of Legislative and Public Affairs of the 
EOIR. 
 193. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 186, at 1. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Interview with Kathryn Mattingly, Office of Legislative Public Affairs of the EOIR (June 29, 2012). 
The author spoke by telephone with Kathryn Mattingly who was not able to provide any further update to the June 
5, 2009 Fact Sheet. However, on August 1, 2012, Ms. Mattingly emailed the author with follow up information 
which provided that in 2010 the EOIR completed improvement measure 18, Digital Audio Recording for all 
immigration courtrooms, and in 2011 measure 10, the Code of Conduct for Immigration Judges was completed (a 
copy of the Press Release concerning the Digital Audio Recording and a copy of the Code of Conduct is on file 
with the author). Ms. Mattingly further responded that the following improvement measures have not been 
implemented: measure 12 (streamlining of reforms), measure 14 (sanction authority for immigration judges), and 
measure 15 (sanction authority for BIA judges). 
 196. TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Latest Data from Immigration Court Show Decline in Asylum Disparity (Jun. 
22, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/209/. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. The author visited the Orlando and San Francisco immigration courts during the summer of 2012 and 
had the opportunity to speak with immigration judges concerning some of the training new immigration judges are 
now receiving. 
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which did not occur before implementation of the twenty-two point plan. However, 
this drop in disparity rates may well also be caused by better lawyering. We know 
that an applicant has a better chance of succeeding if represented by counsel, so the 
implementation of the reforms of the twenty-two point plan may not necessarily be 
totally responsible for the drop in asylum disparity rates.
200
 
5.   The Immigration Court Backlog 
Our immigration courts are backlogged, which denies swift justice for asylum 
seekers. There is a backlog of approximately 300,000 cases awaiting 
adjudication.
201
 “The growing immigration court backlog is not a recent problem . . 
. but has been steadily growing since at least 2005.”
202
 One important cause for this 
problem was the Bush Administration’s failure to “fill vacant and newly-funded 
Immigration Judge positions” during the period of the political hiring scandal.
203
 
“Government filings seeking deportation orders increased between FY 2001 and 
FY 2008 by [thirty] percent while the number of immigration judges on the bench 
saw little increase and for some periods . . . fell.”
204
 “Subsequent hiring . . . to fill 
these vacancies during the Obama [Administration] has not been sufficient to 
handle [all] the cases that await attention.”
205
 
Although there is still a backlog in the immigration courts, the Obama 
Administration instituted two initiatives to help clear the backlog. During the first 
quarter of 2012, “immigration courts issued 2,429 fewer deportation orders than in 
the” fourth quarter of 2011.
206
 Thus, the proportion of cases resulting in an order of 
deportation fell slightly to 64.1%.
207
 In more than a third of all cases, the individual 
was allowed to stay, at least temporarily, in the United States.
208
 
This historic drop in deportations began in August of 2011 when the Obama 
Administration initiated a review of its 300,000 court-case backlog.
209
 “The stated 
goal of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) review was to better 
prioritize and reduce the backup of pending matters that had led to lengthy delays 
in [i]mmigration [c]ourt proceedings of noncitizens [it] wanted to deport.”
210
 “To 
 ________________________  
 200. See Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 340. 
 201. See TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Historic Drop in Deportation Orders Continues as Immigration Court 
Backlog Increases, (Apr. 24, 2012), http://trac.syr.edy/immigration/reports/279/; see also TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., 
Backlog in Immigration Cases Continue to Climb, (Mar. 11, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/225/; 
see also TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Immigration Case Backlog Still Continues To Grow, (Aug. 12, 2010), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/235/; see also TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Immigration Case Backlog Still 
Growing, (May 24, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/232. 
 202. TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Historic Drop in Deportation Orders Continues as Immigration Court 
Backlog Increases, supra note 201, at 3. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 3–4. 
 205. Id. at 4. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. TRAC SYRACUSE UNIV., Historic Drop in Deportation Orders Continues as Immigration Court 
Backlog Increases, supra note 201, at 4. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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achieve this longer-term objective, ICE attorneys assisted by [court clerks, law 
clerks, and paralegals] had been redirected in a [dramatic] effort—part of the 
prosecution discretion initiative—to review all 300,000 cases to prioritize which to 
focus on.”
211
 A consequent drop in overall case dispositions occurred while these 
reviews were being carried out.
212
 As a result, overall court dispositions during the 
first quarter of 2012 fell to 50,489—the lowest level since 2002.
213
 
Another Obama Administration initiative has resulted in fewer deportations. 
On June 15, 2012, the President announced a policy to grant young undocumented 
noncitizens a chance to work and study in the United States without fear of 
deportation.
214
 Under the new policy, ICE would stop attempting to deport these 
undocumented noncitizens “who are under [thirty years of age], came to the United 
States as children, and are otherwise law abiding.”
215
 It has been estimated that 
“[a]s many as 800,000 [such] undocumented residents [now] in the United States 
could qualify for this new legal status.”
216
  
6.   Need for Standardizing Immigration Court Rules 
The final problem this article will explore is the need for standardized rules and 
procedures for the immigration courts. As of the time of writing, there are now 
fifty-nine immigration courts spread across twenty-seven states of the United 
States, Puerto Rico, and in the North Mariana Islands with a total of 263 sitting 
immigration judges.
217
 However, there are no set or standardized rules of procedure 
for the immigration courts.
218
 One scholar has commented on the twenty-two point 
plan for improvement of the immigration courts contending, “[t]he proposed 
reforms, while greatly needed, fall short because they fail to include one of the 
basic tenants of our American court system – rules [sic].
219
 It is hard to play by 
them, invoke them, or enforce them if there are none.”
220
 Some basic immigration 
court procedures are set forth in the INA and the Code of Federal Regulations.
221
 
 ________________________  
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. S.A. Miller, President Obama Moves to Allow Young Illegal Immigrants to Work and Study in the US, 
July 16, 2012 at 5, available at www. http://nypost.com/2012/06/16/president-obama-moves-to-allow-young-
illegal-immigrants-to-work-and-study-in-the-us. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. The new policy provides: 
Illegal immigrants qualify if they: [c]ame to the US before age [sixteen]; [a]re under [thirty] years old; [h]ave 
continuously resided in the US for at least five years preceding the new policy; [a]re in school, graduated from 
high school, earned a GED or were honorably discharged from the US Coast Guard or Armed Forces; [a]nd [h]ave 
not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor or multiple misdemeanors or do not pose a threat to 
national security or public safety. Qualifying illegals would be eligible for: [i]ndefinite deferral of removal from 
the US; [a] two-year work permit; and [n]o limit on the number of renewals for work permits. 
Id. 
 217. See EOIR Immigration Court Listings, supra note 161. 
 218. See Regina Germain, Putting the “Form” in Immigration Court Reform, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1145 
(2006–07).  
 219. Id.  
 220. Id.  
 221. Stacy Caplow, ReNorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 91 (2008). 
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Yet, in everyday practice in different immigration courts one will find locally 
accepted, but unpublished, procedures that are inconsistent with respect to when 
exhibits must be filed,
222
 marking exhibits, and how much hearsay will be allowed 
at an asylum hearing.
223




In 2008, the EOIR published a comprehensive online Immigration Court 
Practice Manual.
225
 The manual was published without any notice or period for 
public comment.
226
 A period for public comment would have allowed the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association and individual immigration 
practitioners to send in comments that might have been helpful in providing 
suggestions, that may have helped to ensure more fairness and impartiality with 
respect to adjudication of asylum claims. The Manual does provide information on 
such court procedures as; filing documents with the court, master calendar 
proceedings, motion practice, bond and detention, and attorney discipline.
227
 
However, the Manual does not have information concerning evidentiary rules for 
the court and fails to encourage pre-hearing preparation, which might narrow the 
available evidence in asylum trials.
228
 Standardized rules of evidence for the 
immigration court would greatly enhance their efficiency.
229
 
IV.  ARTICLE I COURT PROPOSALS AND BILLS 
Again, no court is without some problems. Over the last thirty years there have 
been a number of suggestions as to how to remedy the shortcomings of the 
immigration courts as they are now constituted. The first suggestion judges, 
scholars, and practitioners have made is to take the immigration courts out of the 
Department of Justice and make them an independent court.
230
 The immigration 
courts, situated as they are within the Executive Branch, seem to present a blatant 
conflict of interest. The EOIR is part of a law enforcement agency that oversees the 
 ________________________  
 222. Id. 
 223. These observations are based on the author’s experience in trying asylum cases over a ten-year period 
in the Baltimore and Arlington immigration courts. 
 224. See Caplow, supra note 221, at 92. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 87. Rules of Evidence in immigration courts: 
Fed. R. Evid. 1101. The rules of evidence are relaxed in immigration hearings. 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.7 (2008) (“The immigration judge may receive in evidence any oral or written 
statement that is material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the 
respondent or any person during any investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.”) See also, 
Matter of Wadad, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (BIA 1984). Hearsay is admissible if it is 
probative. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Morgano v. 
Pilliod, 229 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1962, cert. denied[sic] 370 U.S. 924 (1962) (“It is . . . 
well settled that the rules of evidence covering judicial proceedings are not applicable to 
administrative deportation hearings.”). 
Caplow, supra note 221, at 87.  
 230. See Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 387. 
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adjudication of cases of possible immigration law breakers. It is difficult to avoid 
the perception that immigration judges can be partial. Because immigration judges 
are chosen by the Attorney General, and serve at his or her pleasure, they do not 
have the independence to truly see that due process and meaningful justice are 
served.  
Unlike Article III judges, immigration court judges do not have life-time 
tenure.
231
 As a matter of fact, there is no term of office for an immigration judge.
232
 
They serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General and may be removed from the 
bench by the Attorney General for any reason whatsoever.
233
 My anecdotal 
experience with the immigration judges has led me to understand that most of the 
judges come from the enforcement side of the immigration service or from other 
positions within the Department of Justice where they may have served between 
ten and twenty years. Often their appointment as an immigration judge is the 
crowning achievement of their career where they may serve another ten to twenty 
years and then retire.
234
 
The next most cited suggestion for immigration reform is to transform the 
immigration courts into an Article I Legislative Court.
235
 “[T]he Supreme Court has 
recognized Congress’ power to create ‘legislative courts’ under Article I of the 
[U.S.] Constitution.”
236
 Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitution, 
Congress may “constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”
237
 “Article I 
Courts may be staffed with judges who lack life tenure because they do not 
exercise ‘core’ judicial functions for which the federal Constitution requires that 
judges be insulated from politics.”
238
 The Court of Veteran’s Appeals, the Court of 
Federal Claims, and the U.S. Tax Court are Article I Courts.
239
 Often these courts 
handle technical and specialty matters beyond the ken of expertise of other 
practitioners and judges. Although the judges on these courts lack life-time tenure, 
such courts provide a modicum of independence and transparency that is missing 
from the EOIR based immigration court system. 
Maurice A. Roberts’s
240
 thesis states that decision-making under the 
immigration laws was faulty due, in part, to the frequently conflicting roles of the 
 ________________________  
 231. See id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. at 386. 
 234. Again, this is a personal observation from a former Foreign Service Officer who has worked with 
immigration enforcement officers who went on to become immigration judges. 
 235. See Asylum Study, supra note 16, at 386; See also Caplow, supra note 221, at 87; and See Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 
452 (2007). 
 236. David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government Misconduct, 26 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 103 (2005). 
 237. Id. at 104. 
 238. Id. at 105. 
 239. Id. at 146. 
 240. Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 
(1980–1981). At the time of writing the article, Mr. Roberts had retired as Chairman of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. Id. He served as Chairman of the BIA from 1968 through 1974. Id. Prior to his chairmanship, he served 
as Head of the Immigration Litigation Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice from 1965 to 1968. Id. 
26
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/2
Fall 2013 Reforming Immigration Courts 43 
 
INS and the immigration court system.
241
 He argued that the adjudication of 
deportation proceedings should be removed from INS, so that the adjudicators 
could be situated in an independent setting where they could decide “cases fairly 
and promptly, free from dependence” or influence from enforcement officials.
242
 
He proposed that both the BIA and the immigration courts be transferred to a new 
specialized Article I Court.
243
 
Roberts’s proposed law is simple, consisting of a three-and-one-half-page 
appendix to his article containing ten succinct sections.
244
 Section one provides that 
the court would be comprised of an appellate division with seven judges and a trial 
division with fifty judges.
245
 There would be chief judges for both the appellate 
division and trial division to be appointed by the President, “with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, for terms of fifteen years.”
246
 The judges of the appellate and 
the trial divisions would also be chosen by the President, “with the advice and 
consent of the Senate,” and would also serve fifteen-year terms. 
247
 
Sections two and three, respectively, mandate compensation for judges and 
procedures for removing judges for incompetency, misconduct, or neglect of 
duty.
248
 Section four mandates that the appellate division “promulgate rules of 
court governing practice and procedure” in both the appellate division and in the 
trial divisions.
249
 This would solve the problem of lack of standard procedures in 
the immigration courts as they now exist. Section five mandates appellate division 
administration; Section six mandates appellate division jurisdiction; Sections seven 
and eight mandate trial division administration and trial division jurisdiction 
respectively.
250
 Section nine is a “savings” provision.
251
 This means, that if one 
section of the court proposal is invalidated or found to be unconstitutional, then the 
remainder of the court would remain viable. Section ten discusses and defines 
“Finality” of decisions in the two courts.
252
 In this context a final decision of the 
appellate division would be binding on all judges of the trial division and on all 
officers of the United States.
253
 Such “finality” would also be subject to review 
only by the “Supreme Court of the United States on a petition for certiorari.”
254
 
Unfortunately, the Roberts proposal did not provide that the Article I immigration 
judges be granted the authority to sanction lawyers or respondents for contempt of 
court. All judges of every court should be granted contempt power to ensure 
 ________________________  
 241. See id. at 2. 
 242. Id. at11–12. 
 243. Roberts, supra note 240, at 18. 
 244. See id. at 22–25.  
 245. Id. at 21. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Roberts, supra note 240, at 21. 
 250. Id. at 22–23. 
 251. Id. at 23. 
 252. Id. at 24. This section provides that, “a final decision of the appellate decision shall be binding on all 
judges of the trial division and on officers of the United States, and shall be subject to further review only by the 
Supreme Court of the United States on petition for certiorari.” Id.  
 253. Id. 
 254. Roberts, supra note 240, at 24. 
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efficient operation of the court and prevent frivolous or disruptive behavior by 
lawyers or applicants. 
Again, the Roberts proposal is simple but anachronistic. This proposal was 
written just before the Refugee Act of 1980 took effect.
255
 It was this 1980 Act that 
made it necessary for the then existing INS to start holding asylum trials.
256
 There 
was then an increase in immigration court hearings once respondents were allowed 
to seek asylum from persecution. Today the idea of an immigration trial division 
with only fifty judges is unimaginably small—but this was a good start. Some 
thirty years later we have 263 immigration judges sitting in fifty-nine trial division 
courts.
257
 The proposal, if passed by Congress, would have made the immigration 
courts more independent and, perhaps, fairer. Alas, it seems the proposal gained no 
traction and went nowhere. 
In the late 1990s there were actually three bills put forth in Congress by 
Representative Bill McCollum to establish the United States Immigration Court as 
an Article I Court.
258
 All three of the bills were similar and each was referred to the 
House Committee on the Judiciary. Each of the bills died in committee and never 
became law.
259
 Nevertheless, we will analyze the basics of the 1998 bill, which 
represents what Representative McCollum proposed in each bill for an Article I 
Immigration Court. 
In 1998, in the 105th Congress, the bill H.R. 4107 was drafted and referred to 
the Committee on the Judiciary.
260
 The bill would have established an Article I 
Immigration Court consisting of an immigration trial court and an appellate 
division.
261
 The appellate court would consist of a chief judge and eight other 
judges appointed by the President “with advice and consent of the Senate.”
262
 They 
would serve terms of fifteen years.
263
 The appellate judges would sit and hear cases 
as a panel of three judges to decide appeals.
264
 
The trial division would “be composed of a chief immigration trial judge and 
other immigration trial judges, appointed by the Chief Immigration Appeals 
 ________________________  
 255. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 256. Id. 
 257. EOIR Immigration Court Listings, supra note 161.  
 258. To be more accurate, parts of the same bill were put forth three times. In 1996, Representative 
McCollum put forth H.R. 4258. This bill sought to make the immigration courts an Article I court, but it also 
sought to amend asylum procedures under the INA. The bill was sent to the Judiciary Committee and died in the 
committee. In 1998 Representative McCollum put forth H.R. 4107, a bill to create the immigration court as an 
Article I court which was very similar to his 1996, H.R. 4258 with the asylum provisions removed. H.R. 4107 was 
referred to the Judiciary Committee and died in committee. In 1999, Representative McCollum filed bill number 
H.R. 185 put forth as a proposal to make the immigration courts an Article I Court. This bill was essentially the 
same as H.R. 4107 that had been filed a year earlier. This last bill, H.R. 185, was referred to the Judiciary 
Committee only to again die in committee.  
 259. United States Immigration Court Act of 1996, H.R. 4258, 104th Cong., GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr4258; United States Immigration Court Act of 1998, H.R. 4107, 
105th Cong., GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/105/hr4107; United States Immigration Court 
Act of 1999, H.R. 185, 106th Cong., GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hr185. 
 260. United States Immigration Court Act of 1998, H.R. 4107, 105th Cong. (1998).  
 261. Id. at 2. 
 262. Id. at 3. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 4. 
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 The bill further provided that all immigration judges serving at the time 
of enactment of the bill would be appointed Article I Judges by the Chief 
Immigration Judge.
266
 Such trial judges would serve fifteen-year terms and could 
be removed for cause, including “incompetency, misconduct, or neglect of duty.”
267
 
Judges of each division of the court would have the power to punish lawyers or 
respondents for contempt of court, either by fine or imprisonment. 
268
 The 
McCollum bill makes it easier than the Roberts proposal to remove judges from the 
immigration court, but the bill would confer contempt power on the trial and 
appellate judges. This would allow judges to sanction disruptive or frivolous 
behavior by lawyers and applicants.  
The bill clearly articulated the authority of the trial and appellate judges. 
269
 
Section 115 provides that “[t]he appellate division shall promulgate rules of court . 
. . governing . . . the appellate division and trial division.” 
270
 The section provides 
further that, “only such selected provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the appellate division deems appropriate 
for inclusion in the rules of the Immigration Court shall apply to proceedings in 
Immigration Court.”
271
 The bill also spells out rules for retirement.
272
 The bill also 
limits judicial appeals.
273
 The current system allows a respondent who loses an 
appeal in the BIA to appeal the decision to the federal circuit court in the district 
where the immigration court is situated. Representative McCollum’s H.R. 4107 
would limit appeals of such cases only to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit that sits in Washington, D.C.
274
 These are the crucial provisions of the bill. 
It appears that Representative McCollum may have used Roberts’ proposal for 
an Article I Court as a blueprint and then expanded upon it. The two basic 
differences between the Roberts proposal and the McCollum bill is that, first, H.R. 
4107 would confer contempt sanctioning power on both appellate and trial judges 
of the Article I Immigration Court. Second, the Roberts proposal made the 
decisions of the new appellate court final, but they would be subject to review by 
the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.
275
 H.R. 4107 would make the final 
 ________________________  
 265. Id. at 6. 
 266. United States Immigration Court Act of 1998, supra note 260, at 6.  
 267. Id. at 4–9. 
 268. Id. at 14. 
 269. Id. at 9. Authority of Judges: 
Immigration trial judges shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, 
and cross-examine the aliens and any witnesses. Immigration trial judges may take 
depositions, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the 
production of documentation or other evidence from any place in the United States or any 
territory or possession thereof, order the taking of depositions, and order responses to 
written interrogatories. 
Id. 
 270. Id. at 13. 
 271. United States Immigration Court Act of 1998, supra note 260, at 13.  
 272. Id. at 15. 
 273. Id. at 19. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Roberts, supra note 240, at 24. 
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review after the appellate division only to the Federal Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.
276
 This sounds unworkable, for there is only one Federal Court for 
the Federal Circuit which is in Washington, D.C., and it is unlikely that this one 
court could handle all of the appeals of asylum cases which are now spread out 
over eleven federal circuit courts. 
Although it was not a proposal made in either a law review article like 
Roberts’s or a bill like Representative McCollum’s, the National Association of 
Immigration Judges advocated for an independent immigration court in a January 
2002 position paper.
277
 The Association favored the creation of an Article I 
Court.
278
 In their position paper they cite the work of Maurice Roberts. 
279
 The 
position paper argued that an independent immigration court would promote more 




Unfortunately, we still have no Article I Immigration Court independent of the 
Department of Justice. There may be two reasons we have no such court. Some 
argue that there may be no political will in Congress to appropriate the type of 
money to transform the immigration judiciary into an independent Article I Court. 
However, such argument may be without merit. It already costs millions of dollars 
to maintain the EOIR within the Justice Department. However, the EOIR is not 
really in the Justice Department building on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, 
D.C.; it is housed in a separate facility in Arlington, Virginia.
281
 If such a change 
was made it would not be much more expensive than the status quo, since the 
change would be more formalistic than substantive. The same structure that is the 
existing courts, judges and staff would remain in existence but under a different 
name and under standardized rules and procedures promulgated and put in place. 
The headquarters of the new court could even remain in the EOIR’s present 
facilities in Arlington. 
Also going forward, pursuant to the McCollum bills, the Chief Appellate Judge 
and the eight other appellate judges would be chosen by the President of the United 
States, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The chief judge of the trial 
division and the trial division judges would be chosen by the chief appellate judge. 
It appears that there could be an almost seamless transition from the EOIR to the 
Article I Court for little more money than is now used to fund the courts as part of 
the Department of Justice. 
The second reason we may not have an Article I Court may be because 
agencies in the administrative state may be loath to abandon power to another 
entity. In essence, no sitting Attorney General would voluntarily relinquish the 
power and responsibility of running the EOIR, for it would result in loss of his 
 ________________________  
 276. United States Immigration Court Act of 1998, supra note 260, at 20. 
 277. See, Hon. Dana Marks Keener and Hon. Denise Noonan Slavin, An Independent Immigration Court: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come. A Position Paper by the National Association of Immigration Judges. January, 
2002 (on file with Barry Law Review). 
 278. Id. at 15.  
 279. Id. at 20 n.57. 
 280. Id. at 15. 
 281. EOIR Immigration Court Listings, supra note 161.  
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stature as well as a considerable amount of the Attorney General’s budget. There 
appears to be no political will on the part of the Attorney General to see an Article 
I Court created. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
I have written this article partially to reaffirm my support for our use of asylum 
as a means of providing justice for those fleeing persecution, for noncitizens like 
Gramoz Prestreshi, and partially to educate those interested in asylum concerning 
the workings of our immigration courts. Our immigration courts are busy tribunals 
wherein appointed immigration judges must decide in many cases who should be 
granted asylum and who should be denied. It should be a system that strives to be 
fair and impartial in its decision-making concerning those fleeing persecution. 
More often than not, the immigration courts do not appear to be fair and impartial 
in their decisions.  
In examining recent statistics on asylum, it is heartening to learn that asylum 
case filings are down. However, grants of asylum are higher than they have been in 
the last twenty-five years. This is a wonderful trend. Nevertheless, over the years 
there have been disparities in grants of asylum among various immigration courts, 
as well as disparities in such decisions between judges on the same court. The 
Asylum Study findings that I have cited in this article serve to reinforce and give 
statistical support to what I and other immigration court practitioners have often 
believed: while an ideal court system should be fair and impartial, more often than 
not, a request for asylum by a noncitizen becomes a game of “refugee roulette” in 
our current immigration court system. 
The outcome of the case might depend more upon arbitrary factors such as the 
judge to whom the case is assigned, whether one has counsel, and the ethnic and 
gender identity of the judge, instead of the facts of the particular claim. 
Research shows that since the imposition of the Attorney General’s twenty-two 
point plan to improve the Immigration Court in 2006, disparities in asylum 
outcomes among the various immigration courts and among immigration judges on 
the same court have been declining. The 2007 immigration judge hiring scandal led 
to a return to politically neutral hiring measures and better training and oversight 
for immigration judges. There are now fifty-nine immigration courts spread over 
twenty-seven states of the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands, staffed by a total of 263 sitting judges. 
I examined proposals of what an Article I Immigration Court system could 
look like. A two division court—an appellate division and a trial division—where 
the chief judge of the appellate division and eight other appellate judges would be 
appointed by the President of the United States and with the consent of Congress, 
would sit for a fifteen-year term. The chief of the appellate division would appoint 
the chief judge of the trial division and the trial judges who would also sit for 
fifteen-year terms, on good behavior. The structure is already in place. It would not 
necessarily be much more costly to run such an Article I Immigration Court than it 
is to pay the costs of operating the immigration courts as part of the EOIR. 
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I believe that an independent Article I Immigration Court would be better for 
asylum seekers because a court free of oversight by the Attorney General would 
offer better independence and impartiality for asylum seekers.  
Yet, there seems to be no political will from Congress to create such a court. 
Nor does it appear that the United States Attorney General is anxious to relinquish 
his oversight of the immigration courts. It is the author’s hope that this article 
might convince Congress to consider Article I Court proposals that have been put 
forth over the last thirty years.  
Due process for asylum seekers demands that there be fairness and impartiality 
in an independent immigration court. An Article I Immigration Court promulgated 
by an act of Congress would provide for such a fair and impartial court. 
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